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INTRODUCTION
Incident reporting is widely recognised as
an important method for improving
safety in healthcare, and many countries
have established their own incident
reporting systems.1 However, the actual
value of these systems is increasingly
subject to debate.2 Reporting systems,
both local and national, are overwhelmed
by the volume of reports and fall short in
defining recommendations for improving
healthcare safety: ‘We collect too much
and do too little’.3
The purpose of these systems is also
under debate. The UK, for example,
struggles to clarify whether incident
reports should be used to help healthcare
organisations learn, or whether they
should help regulators and funders to
make judgements.4 As healthcare inspect-
ors tasked with running a national hos-
pital incident reporting system (IL, SM
and JV), we recognise the issues
described above. In this article, we show
how the theories in the evolving scientific
literature on incident reporting apply to
our situation. Our work since 2012 acts
as an empirical example of how reporting
systems could have an effect if they focus
on the learning process within hospitals
instead of on solutions for reported
safety issues. As TS Eliot is quoted as
saying: “The journey, not the arrival,
matters.”
LEARNING HOW TO HIT A MOVING
TARGET
The conception of ‘incident’ changes over
time
Vincent and Amalberti argued that safety
in healthcare is a moving target, because
innovation and improving standards in
healthcare alter the conceptions of both
harm and preventability.5 This dynamic
view of healthcare safety can be illu-
strated by the 1996 Dutch legal
definition for a sentinel event (SE), the
most serious class of incidents that
healthcare organisations are mandated to
report (see box 1). Since rising standards
of care influence the way incidents are
judged, an incident in 2005 can be
judged differently in 2015 using the iden-
tical definition.6 Moreover, the standards
of the healthcare quality community
change faster, because they stay up to
date on quality improvement innovations,
than the standards of many frontline per-
sonnel. As a consequence, there is an
endless discussion between hospitals and
the healthcare inspectorate as to which
incidents are classified as SE and should
therefore be reported. Another conse-
quence is that our national incident
reporting system cannot provide the
inspectorate with a representative view of
clinical safety issues, or a means to
measure safety improvement over time.
Standards for corrective actions change over
time
Just as the standards for what is defined
as incident shift, so do the standards for
corrective actions. For example, Behr
et al7 conducted research into three
healthcare incidents that attracted signifi-
cant public attention. These were a paedi-
atric cardiology case in 2001, a
cardiothoracic case in 2005 and a neur-
ology case in 2009. Although the cases
were similar in many respects, the
authors found a shift in the way the cases
were perceived. The 2001 case was seen
as a professional problem, the 2005 case
a managerial problem and the 2009 case
a governance problem. Each perception
led to corrective actions fitting that view:
removal of the professionals, sacking of
the board and problems for the regulator.
What was deemed an adequate corrective
action in 2001 was deemed inadequate
4 years later. If we are to keep up with
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advancements in safety-related insights then the goal
of reporting systems should not be the corrective
action itself, but the ability to determine appropriate
corrective actions.
Healthcare providers need to be able to hit moving
targets
Incidents are not something in themselves; they are
symptoms of a larger problem. Instead of targeting
the ‘symptoms’, it seems better in the long term to
target the ‘causes of the disease’. That is to have the
healthcare providers learn how to cope with the infin-
ite variability of safety issues by learning how to
analyse these and how to devise corrective actions that
fit their local setting. Incident reporting systems
should therefore lead to social and participative learn-
ing at the local level.3 Safety issues will keep sneaking
up on healthcare providers from all directions. Hitting
a moving target over and over again requires a differ-
ent set of skills from hitting a fixed target once. Being
engaged in analysing incidents can serve as a catalyst
for changing the way healthcare providers think about
risk and increase their vigilance.8 Healthcare provi-
ders will only learn to hit this continuous stream of
moving targets once they properly analyse their
incidents.
SHIFTING THE GOAL OF INCIDENT REPORTING
Focusing on the learning, not the outcome
Dutch hospitals are mandated by law to report all
serious incidents, defined as SEs, to the Healthcare
Inspectorate (IGZ) (see box 2). The IGZ receives
about 800 SE reports annually from the 93 Dutch
hospitals. In 2012, the IGZ decided to shift its focus
from what hospitals learn from their SEs to how hos-
pitals learn from their SEs. The inspectors felt that
this would improve the effect of their work. In 2010,
the IGZ had made a similar shift in their supervision
of suicide reports, turning the focus on the organisa-
tional learning ability of mental healthcare institu-
tion.9 Organisational learning is defined as the process
of creating and applying valid knowledge to enable an
organisation to improve.10 The IGZ expected that the
learning ability of hospitals would improve by addres-
sing conditions for learning from SEs, which would
contribute to safety.11 12
The quality of the learning process is now quantified
using the 2012 WHO draft report ‘Concise Incident
Analysis’, supplemented with extra items on patient
engagement (see box 3).13 Each SE analysis report
receives a score of between 0% and 100%, indicating
the percentage of items addressed adequately. Since
July 2013, the scores have been added to a database
showing the quality of SE analysis reports over time.
These figures are benchmarked to give the IGZ insight
into the quality and rate of improvement of each indi-
vidual hospital compared with other hospitals (see
figure 1). These data are discussed with each hospital
individually during an annual meeting between the
hospital board and the IGZ as one of many agenda
items. If the data are a cause for concern, then the IGZ
plans a separate meeting with the board and the hospi-
tal’s SE investigating committee. The data are not pub-
licly accessible.
Between July 2013 and August 2015, the overall
average score for the quality of SE analysis reports
moved from 64% to 78% (n=1675 SE reports).
Shifting the focus from what hospitals learn to how
hospitals learn has several advantages:
▸ It is independent of changes in the conception of
‘incident’.
▸ It gives healthcare professionals and boards the room to
devise and apply tailor-made corrective actions.
▸ Changes in the learning curve can be tracked with each
new analysis report.
▸ Data make it possible for the IGZ to focus on hospitals
that lag behind.
▸ The effect of interventions by the IGZ on specific items
(eg, patient engagement) can be tracked over time.
Many have stressed the value of multidisciplinary
input, as well as physicians’ and hospital boards’
engagement, for optimising learning and reinforcing
the importance of safety.11 14 Based on the SE analysis
reports, the annual meetings with hospitals and the
on-site inspections, we can conclude that all Dutch
hospitals now have multidisciplinary investigating
committees. All committees include physicians (often
as chair) and all hospital boards provide support for
their committees and reporting systems.
Several explanations can be given why this learning
process has engaged physicians, although we cannot
Box 2 IGZ
The Dutch Healthcare Inspectorate (in Dutch: Inspectie
voor de Gezondheidszorg; IGZ) is part of the Ministry of
Health, Welfare and Sport. The IGZ oversees and regu-
lates all Dutch healthcare providers and professionals, as
well as all medicines, medical devices and medical tech-
nology. The IGZ is mandated to use enforcement mea-
sures if those inspected do not comply.
Box 1 Sentinel event
A sentinel event (Dutch: calamiteit) is defined in the
1996 Healthcare Organisations Quality Act as an unin-
tended and unexpected event, related to the quality of
care and having caused death or serious harm to the
patient. All healthcare organisations are mandated to
report sentinel events to the Healthcare Inspectorate
within 3 days after discovery.
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support these scientifically. One possible reason is that
the IGZ has more or less mandated hospitals to
engage physicians and checks this regularly. Other
factors that might play a role are increased awareness
of patient safety and greater engagement of physicians
in other patient safety activities, creating more interest
among physicians to contribute to SE analysis.
Limitations of focusing on learning
However hard the IGZ strives for a ‘just culture’, one
that is defined as a focus on learning opposed to pun-
ishing, there could always remain a sense of fear
among healthcare providers that could ultimately
influence their openness and thus the validity of their
SE analysis reports.15 Since 2013, the IGZ has been
pushing hospitals to engage the patient or a patient
representative in SE analysis. This provides the IGZ
with an external check on the report’s validity, but it
might also increase the hospital’s unease. This aspect
deserves further research.
Another concern is that the focus on the process
instead of the content makes the IGZ miss signals of
recurrent safety issues. This is in part mitigated by the
team that judges the analyses because they can recognise
emerging themes. An example of such a theme is serious
harm to infants after anaesthesia, which was independ-
ently reported by different hospitals and led to the IGZ
informing the Dutch Society of Anaesthesia.
Relying on memory is clearly not a sustainable
method for a regulator, and it is reasonable to assume
Box 3 Questionnaire for scoring used by the IGZ
These questions are used by inspectors to judge the quality of a sentinel event analysis report. Points can be scored with
each question. Sometimes a question is irrelevant, for example, ‘Was external expertise consulted?’, when external expert-
ise would not add anything of value to the analysis. The total amount of points is divided by the total amount of relevant
questions, leading to a percentage. This percentage is the overall score of the sentinel event analysis report.
Process
▸ How soon after the event was identified did investigation start?
▸ Is the investigating committee multidisciplinary?
▸ Were any members of investigating committee involved in the incident?
▸ Is the method for analysis specified? (eg, root cause analysis (RCA))
▸ Was input sought from all personnel directly involved?
▸ Was input sought from other staff with knowledge about the care process?
▸ Was input sought from the patient/relatives?
Reconstruction
▸ Does the description of the event give a complete picture of the relevant ‘scenes’?
Analysis
▸ Has the question ‘why’ been asked extensively enough to analyse the underlying cause and effect?
▸ Have the investigators searched relevant scientific literature?
▸ Does the report state whether applicable guidelines/protocols were followed?
▸ Was external expertise consulted?
▸ Does the report state whether the medical indication for the provided care was correct?
Conclusions
▸ Does the report identify root causes?
▸ Do the root causes fit the reconstruction and analysis?
▸ Are contributing factors considered and/or identified?
▸ Are contributing factors, not under the control of the hospital, considered and/or identified?
Recommendations
▸ Does the report document recommendations for improving processes and systems?
▸ Do these corrective actions address the identified root causes?
▸ Have the corrective actions been formalised? (eg, Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Realistic and Time-Sensitive
(SMART))
▸ Does the hospital have an evaluation plan to determine if the recommendations are implemented?
▸ Will the impact of the recommendations be evaluated?
Aftercare
▸ Is the aftercare for the patient/relatives described?
▸ Is the aftercare for the professionals involved described?
▸ Has the report been shared with the patient/relatives?
▸ Reaction of hospital board
▸ Is the reaction of the board adequate?
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that the IGZ misses relevant safety issues. We also rec-
ognise that SE analysis is just one step in the path to
improvement. The next step is actually implementing
the recommended corrective actions and demonstrat-
ing whether the improved learning ability of hospitals
leads to safety improvement. Furthermore, learning
from SEs is just one of the many activities needed to
improve patient safety, and the score we assign to the
quality of SE analysis reports is not a measure for the
overall safety in that hospital.
CONCLUSION
Focusing incident reporting systems on the local
learning process of healthcare providers could miti-
gate many of the problems that have been attributed
to reporting systems in the literature. We have rede-
signed the Dutch national incident reporting system
to rate each individual hospital’s learning process by
scoring the quality of their SE analysis reports.
Using the data this generates, we can benchmark
hospitals’ learning curve, act on hospitals that lag
behind and track their subsequent improvement
over time.
Although we describe work that is still in progress
and under research, preliminary data suggests a meas-
urable improvement in Dutch hospitals’ ability to
learn from their own SEs. This raises several ques-
tions, the most important being whether the quality
of SE analysis reports is a true reflection of a hospi-
tal’s learning process. While the effect on patient
safety has yet to be proven, shifting the goal of inci-
dent reporting systems from solving specific safety
issues to improving the process of learning seems a
promising strategy.
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